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HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL 261 
Courts Rule Too Narrowly Regarding the Right to 
Wear Religious Clothing in Public 
Kendyl L. Green* 
ABSTRACT 
For numerous years, state and institutional rules have barred 
individuals from wearing religious clothing.  Specifically, this issue has 
arisen in the military, the workplace, police departments, prisons, and 
public schools.  Clothing communicates information about one’s country of 
origin, religion, and sexual desires.  As discussed below, wearing religious 
clothing is a vital aspect of Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism.  For instance, 
head coverings, including yarmulkes, hijabs, and turbans, are essential in 
the eyes of some observers.  Traditionally, more observant individuals may 
desire to wear religious clothing everyday.  The United States Constitution 
upholds this religious liberty in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Additionally, the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) statutes also protect religious 
freedom.  Cases are examined that upheld religious freedom by making 
accommodations as well as others that, unfortunately, denied religious 
freedom to individuals.  Because religious clothing is crucial to observers 
of Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism, courts should broadly construe the laws to 
encourage religious accommodations in public environments where a state 
or institutional law bars an adherent from following his or her religion, 
unless granting the accommodation would cause harm to other individuals.   
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
State or institutional rules barring an individual from wearing religious 
clothing have been a source of controversy for many years.  Specifically, 
this issue arises in the military, the workplace, police departments, prisons, 
and public schools.  Wearing religious clothing is a vital aspect of many 
religions, specifically, Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism.  The United States 
Constitution does not prohibit religious clothing because it would violate 
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the First and Fourteenth Amendments.1 Additionally, the Religious 
Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA) also protect religious freedom.2  Some courts have upheld 
religious freedom by making accommodations, which is seen in the Singh 
v. McHugh, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, EEOC v. Autozone, J.B. Hunt 
Transport Services, and Holt v. Hobbs cases.3  Unfortunately, some courts 
have placed limits on religious accommodations, which is analyzed below 
in Goldman v. Weinberger, Webb v. City of Philadelphia, Riback v. L.V. 
Metro. Police Dept., Khatib v. County of Orange, United States v. Bd. of 
Educ., and Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J.4  Because religious clothing 
is crucial to observers of Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism, courts should 
broadly construe the laws to encourage religious accommodations in public 
environments where a state or institutional law bars an adherent from 
following his or her religion, unless granting the accommodation would 
cause harm to other individuals.   
II. HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS CLOTHING IN JUDAISM, ISLAM, 
AND SIKHISM 
Religious apparel is a part of observing Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism, 
among other religions.  Clothing is used as a form of nonverbal 
communication in two manners: “clothing as self-definition and clothing as 
a reflection of societal roles and perceptions.”5  Clothing may “nonverbally 
communicate information about individuals, the nature of their 
interpersonal relationships, and the overall context in which interpersonal 
interactions occur.”6  Before any verbal exchanges, clothing allows 
individuals [to] project information about their sex, age, country of origin, 
religion, sexual desires, and socioeconomic class prior to any verbal 
 
 1.   U.S. CONST. amend. 1.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
 2.   42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 
No. 103-141, § 3, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012)). The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).   
 3.   EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 
S. Ct. 853 (2015); Singh v. McHugh, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D.D.C. 2016); EEOC v. 
Autozone, No. 10-11648, slip op. at 1 (D. Mass. Mar. 29, 2013); J.B. Hunt Transport Settles 
EEOC Religious Discrimination Charge for $260,000, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release. 
 4.   Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986); Khatib v. County of Orange, 639 
F.3d. 898 (9th Cir. 2011); Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990); Cooper v. Eugene 
Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298 (Or. 1968); Riback v. L.V. Met. Pol. Dept., No. 2:07-cv-
1152-RLH-LRL, 2008 WL 3211279, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 6, 2008).  
 5.   Debra Reece, Covering and Communication: The Symbolism of Dress among 
Muslim Women, 7 HOW. J. COMM. 35 (1996) (discussing the meaning and various types of 
veils Muslim women may wear to uphold the cultural and religious customs in Islam). 
 6.   Id. at 36.  
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exchange.7  Many religions, including Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism, 
incorporate headgear, which visibly indicates religious affinity and 
sometimes national origin.8  The more important religion is to an 
individual, the more he or she may want to express religion through dress.9   
Specifically, in Judaism, the Bible presents a woman’s hair as an 
ornament that enhances her appearance.10  Because “a woman’s hair is 
considered ervah, or erotic stimulus, [it] must therefore be covered.”11  As 
a way for women to visibly express their observance of the laws of Judaism 
and the Torah, some women choose to practice veiling “to fulfill [their] 
obligation to serve as ‘redeemer of the Jewish people.’”12  The Torah 
specifies that a married woman must “wear a head-covering that hides all 
her hair from view.”13  Today, “women who obey these laws ascribe 
various meanings to the act of head-covering: it is a sign of marriage, or of 
identification with the tribe; a symbol of piety and humility; an act of 
deference to the Divine Will; [and] a sign of sexual modesty.”14  There are 
different ways to veil oneself, including wearing a scarf (tichel), a wig 
(sheitel), a hat, or a net to cover up a woman’s natural hair.15  
Additionally, it is stated in the Bible that men must cover their heads.16  
Rabbi Joseph Karo’s sixteenth century Jewish law code, Shulhan Arukh, 
rules that a man may not walk more than four cubits be-gilui rosh, with his 
head uncovered.”17  This is based on the “Talmudic passage in Tractate 
Kiddushin 31a, which state[s]: It is forbidden for a man to walk four amos 
with an upright posture.”18  Covering one’s head demonstrates piety and, 
additionally separates Jews from Gentiles.19  Christians bare their heads as 
a sign of respect, but for Jewish people, exposing one’s head would violate 
the hukkot hagoyim, or customs of the nations.20  Therefore, yarmulkes, or 
head coverings, remain a crucial cultural and religious aspect of Judaism.  
 
 7.   Reece, supra note 5 at 68. 
 8.   Michael Newman & Faith Isenhath, Use Your Head! Title VII Provides for 
Reasonable Accommodation for Religious Headwear, 56 FED. L. 14 (2009) (discussing the 
importance of headwear in religious practice).  
 9.   Reece, supra note 5, at 37.  
 10.   Leila Bronner, From Veil to Wig: Jewish Women’s Hair Covering, 42 JUDAISM: A 
Q. J. OF JEWISH LIFE & THOUGHT 4 (1993).  
 11.   Reorienting the Veil, UNC CENTER FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, https://veil.unc.edu/r 
eligions/judaism.  
 12.   Reorienting the Veil, supra note 11.  
 13.   Id.  
 14.   Susan Weiss, Demystification of Women’s Head Covering in Jewish Law, 17 
NASHIM: A JRN’L JEWISH WOMEN’S STUD. & GENDER ISSUES 89 (2009).  
 15.   Richard Freund, The Veiling of Women in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, UNIV. 
OF HARTFORD MAURICE GREENBERG CENTER FOR JUDAIC STUDIES (2011). 
 16.   Dan Rabinowitz, Yarmulke: A Historic Cover-Up?, HAKIRAH, THE FLATBRUSH J. OF 
JEWISH L. AND THOUGHT 221, 223 (2007).   
 17.   Id. at 223. 
 18.   Id.  
 19.   Id. at 224. 
 20.   ALEX BEIN, THE JEWISH QUESTION: BIOGRAPHY OF A WORLD PROBLEM 489 (1990).  
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Like Judaism, Islam also requires specific clothes for observers. 
Clothing has been tied to purity or impurity and modesty or immodesty, 
and serves to differentiate the believers from the nonbelievers.21  Also, 
clothing distinguishes the men from the women.22  Some Muslims believe a 
woman must cover her body “from a man with whom she is not mahram 
[or cannot marry] and that she should not flaunt herself or put her body on 
display in society.  She is asked not to stimulate the attention of men by 
any means.”23  As a result, many women wear a veil.24  A veil varies 
tremendously, but may include “covering the entire face with a translucent 
piece of cloth; covering most of the face except for the eyes in a mask-like 
appearance; and covering the head, concealing the hair and neck.” Each of 
these definitions assumes the covering of the head, neck, and bosom with a 
loose outer garment.25  
Wearing a hijab, commonly known as a veil, is a manner in which a 
woman may remain modest under the law of the Quran.26  The term hijab 
“has a three-dimensional nature, including the visual, hiding something 
from sight; the spatial, separating and establishing boundaries; and the 
ethical, stating that something is forbidden.”27  The pivotal event in the 
Quran to invoke a hijab involved “the lowering of a curtain to protect the 
intimacy of Muhammad and his wife, and to exclude one of Muhammad’s 
male companions.”28  The Quran declares, “Say to the believing women to 
cast down their glance and guard their private parts (24:31).”29  The Quran 
even goes as far as using the word hijab in its text, stating, “. . . and when 
you ask his wives for any object, ask them from behind a curtain (hijab) . . . 
(33:53).”30  Clothing serves as a means of nonverbal, symbolic 
communication both within the Islamic society and outside of it.31  It plays 
a large part in defining social roles constructed by Islam and Muslim 
 
 21.   Reece, supra note 5, at 38. “The word ‘Islam’ means ‘submission, surrender, and 
obedience,’ but as a religion, Islam represents the complete submission to G[-]d.” Aliah 
Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical 
Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY 
L.J. 441, 445 (2008).  
 22.   Id.  
 23.   Murtadha Mutahari, Islamic Hijab Modest Dress (2007).  
 24.   Reece, supra note 5. “The word ‘Islam’ means ‘submission, surrender, and 
obedience,’ but as a religion, Islam represents the complete submission to G[-]d.” Aliah 
Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical 
Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY 
L.J. 441, 445 (2008).   
 25.   Id.  
 26.   Mutahari, supra note 23.  
 27.   Reece, supra note 5, at 40.  
 28.   Id.  See also Ali Ammoura, Banning the Hijab in Prisons: Violations of 
Incarcerated Muslim Women’s Right to Free Exercise of Religion, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
657, 659 (2013).   
 29.   AL-ISLAM.ORG, https://www.al-islam.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). 
 30.   Id. 
 31.   Reece, supra note 5, at 40.  
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individuals regarding a woman’s role in society.32  Today, many Muslim 
women have chosen to wear a head covering that covers only the head and 
neck and does not cover the face.33  They find this balances upholding their 
religion and culture with blending into society.34  
Lastly, Sikhism also mandates that individuals wear head coverings 
and specific religious clothing. “Sikhs who have made a public 
commitment to the faith by going through a special baptism, known as the 
Amrit Ceremony, are called members of the Khalsa (the community of 
baptized Sikhs).”35  After going through the ceremony, they adopt five 
symbols known as the Five K’s, which show Sikh identity as well as 
powerful religious meaning.36  “The Five K’s are the five items of dress 
and physical appearance given to the Sikhs by Guru Gobind Singh when he 
gathered together the first members of the Khalsa on Baisakhi Day in 
1699.”37  The first of the Five K’s is the kesh, or uncut hair and beard to 
sustain him or her in higher consciousness and a turban which is the crown 
of spirituality.38  Having uncut hair represents a Sikh’s devotion to G-d.39 
Second, the kangha, a small wooden comb, represents hygiene and 
discipline to groom one’s hair.40  Katchera, the third K, is specially made 
cotton underwear to signify purity.41  Fourth, Kara is a steel circle, or 
bangle, which is “worn on the wrist, signifying bondage to Truth and 
freedom from every other entanglement.”42  Lastly, Kirpan is a sword 
which is possessed by the Khalsa to defend the line of truth.43  
The Sikh turbans also have specific meanings.44  There are two main 
styles including the “‘beaked’ kind worn by those who trace their origins to 
the Pothohar area around Rawalpindi and the flatter variety favored by 
those who belong to the plains of the Punjab.”45  Individuals “from the 
plains tie their turbans in a variety of fashions, [with] the two most popular 
being the Patiala Shahi and the Ludhiana styles.  The Patiala Shahi has 
layers of folded cloth (lar) on both sides of the turban.”46  Conversely, the 
 
 32.   Reece, supra note 5, at 40. 
 33.   Id.  
 34.   Id.  
 35.   The Five K’s, http://www.amritsar.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).  
 36.   Id.  
 37.   Id.  
 38.   RELIGION AND THE BODY 296–97 (Sarah Coakley ed., 1st ed. 1997).  
 39.   The Five K’s, supra note 35.  
 40.   Id.  
 41.   Id.  
 42.   Id.  
 43.   Id.  
 44.   Hew McLeod, The Five Ks of the Khalsa Sikhs, 128 J. AM. ORIENTAL SOC’Y 325 
(2008).  
 45.   Id.  
 46.   McLeod, supra note 44.  “Sikh women do not normally wear a turban, but certain 
sects require it.  Prominent amongst these are members of the Akhand Kirtani Jatha and also 
the 3HO Sikhs who observe teachings of Yogi Bhajan.”  Id.   
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Ludhiana style has lar on one side while the other side is plain.47  “The 
color of the turban is also significant. Dark blue is worn by followers of the 
Akali party or by Nihangs.  White designates either a Congress supporter or 
an elderly Sikh.”48  Furthermore, saffron colored turbans are worn by 
followers of the Khalistani movement and patterned turbans are favored by 
Sikhs from southeast Asian countries.49  Because clothing is a significant 
religious attribute of Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism, many individuals choose 
to uphold these rules.  
III. LEGAL SOURCES ADDRESSING  
RELIGIOUS GARB RIGHTS  
Even though the religious laws of Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism 
command individuals to wear clothing or style their physical appearance in 
a particular manner, some public institutions in America and state laws do 
not permit religious individuals to dress or style their bodies to observe 
their religion.  As discussed below, some argue wearing head coverings or 
styling one’s hair in a particular manner illustrates a statement for a 
specific religion, conflicting with the First Amendment and Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.50  The Free Exercise Clause 
in the First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”51  
Additionally, individuals argue that the Establishment Clause, which 
prohibits the government from making any law “respecting an 
establishment of religion,” would also be violated if the country permits 
people to wear religious clothing or alter their physical appearance to 
match a religious rule because it expresses the observance of a particular 
religion.52  However, unless granting religious accommodations would be 
harmful to others, barring individuals from wearing religious clothing or 
altering their physical appearance to abide by the religious rules prohibits 
freedom for individuals to practice their religion.53  “Where government 
action interferes with or coerces religious practice, challenges are almost 
always analyzed under . . . the”54 First Amendment.  
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court used the test known as the 
“Lemon Test” to establish whether the government had violated the 
Establishment Clause.55  To avoid a violation, there must be a significant 
 
 47.   McLeod, supra note 44 
 48.   Id.  
 49.   Id.  
 50.   U.S. CONST. amend. I.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 51.   Id.  
 52.   Id.  
 53.   Id.  
 54.   Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection 
Clause for Religious Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. 665 
(2008).  
 55.   Lemon v. Kurtzman, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (1971).  
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secular purpose, the action must not have the primary effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion, and it does not foster excessive entanglement 
between government and religion.56  This test may be applied to other cases 
to assess whether a First Amendment violation has occurred. Furthermore, 
Americans also believe the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which states the Constitution cannot “deny any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” and is violated if an 
individual is not permitted to wear religious apparel.57  Barring individuals 
from wearing religious clothing would violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it would deny individuals equal protection for the right to freedom 
of religion.58  
In addition to the United States Constitution, the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) also protects religious freedom.  After the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, religious 
liberty took a setback.59  “Before Smith, the Supreme Court’s free exercise 
test had prohibited the government from burdening a person’s religious 
exercise unless the government demonstrated that it had a compelling 
interest, not achievable by other means, that justified trumping the person’s 
religious practice.”60  However, Smith “reversed this traditional 
presumption: the government no longer had to show an important reason 
for overriding a person’s religious convictions no matter how easy it would 
be for the government to accommodate her religious exercise.”61  RFRA 
was passed to “restore the ‘compelling interest’ test by once again placing 
the burden on the government to demonstrate that a law is compelling and 
unachievable by less restrictive means.”62  Generally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
1 protects religious freedoms, but provides for a narrow exception by 
including the compelling interest test.63  The compelling interest test in 
section three part (b) declares that the “[g]overnment may substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person––(1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”64  Even though the 
statute provides for an exception, the government has a significant standard 
 
 56.   Id.  
 57.   U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
 58.   Id.  
 59.   Kimberlee Wood Colby, The 20th Anniversary of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 4 J. CHRISTIAN LEGAL THOUGHT 12 (2014). 
 60.   Id.  
 61.   Id.  
 62.   Id.  “Republican Senator Orrin Hatch and Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy 
together led the effort to pass RFRA in the Senate.  The Senate passed RFRA by a vote of 
97-3, … followed by a unanimous voice vote in the House.”  Shortly after, “President 
Clinton signed RFRA into law on November 16, 1993.”  Id. 
 63.   Religious Freedom Restoration Act, § 3, 107 Stat. 1488 at 1488–89.  
 64.   Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 63. 
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to overcome accommodating an individual’s religious needs.65   
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits prospective 
employers from refusing to hire an applicant in order to avoid 
accommodating a religious practice that it could accommodate without 
undue hardship.66  Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was 
amended by Section 107 in 1991 and states, “An unlawful employment 
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice.”67  Congress amended Title VII to include beliefs 
and practices by adding a definition of religion.  “Religion includes all 
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an 
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an 
employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”68  
Therefore, it is a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
not hire a prospective employee merely because of an employee’s desire to 
wear religious clothing or have a distinct physical appearance displaying 
his or her religion.69  
Lastly, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA) is a law that also protects individuals’ religious freedom.70  The 
Act was codified into 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) which states,  
[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious 
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as 
defined in [42 U.S.C. § 1997], even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates 
that imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of 
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.71 
42 U.S.C. § 1997 defines institution as any facility or institution which 
is owned, operated, or managed by, or provides services on behalf of, any 
State or political subdivision of States, and which is a jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility or pretrial detention facility.72  This statute protects the 
religious freedom of individuals who are incarcerated or held in holding 
cells in court facilities.73  
 
 65.   Id.  
 66.   Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. at 2028.  
 67.   The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 
(1991).  
 68.   Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title 
VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 741–42 (1996).  
 69.   See id.  
 70.   42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012).  
 71.   Id.  
 72.   42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2012).  
 73.   See id.  
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IV. COURTS DECIDING WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL IS 
ENTITLED TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
For many years, the court system has decided whether an individual is 
entitled to religious liberty when there is a state or institutional rule that 
would be violated if they did visibly observe their religion.  Too often, the 
courts have ruled to uphold the state or institutional rules, barring an 
observer from the freedom to practice his or her religion when the 
accommodation would not harm others.  Specifically, using Singh v. 
McHugh and Goldman v. Weinberger, this paper will begin with an 
analysis of the courts’ both sympathetic and restrictive rulings in the 
military.74  Next, it will discuss the courts’ decisions in EEOC v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch, EEOC v. Autozone, and the J.B. Hunt Transport 
Services cases to uphold religious freedom in the workplace.75  Thirdly, it 
explores the cases Webb v. City of Philadelphia and Riback v. L.V. Metro. 
Police Dept., which discuss instances where the court ruled too narrowly 
and upheld the restriction barring an officer from having religious freedom 
in the police department.76  Fourthly, courts have also ruled both broadly 
and narrowly on religious freedom in prisons and holding cells, as we see 
in Holt v. Hobbs and Khatib v. County of Orange.77  Lastly, there has been 
a great deal of controversy regarding whether a teacher should have 
religious freedom when it violates a rule in public schools as well.  United 
States v. Bd. of Educ., and Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J are 
examples of where the courts have decided to uphold institution or state 
laws and disregard an individual’s right to freedom of religion.78  
Unfortunately, because of the way courts have ruled, there are too many 
instances where an individual is denied his or her right to observe a 
religion.  
A. RELIGION IN THE MILITARY 
The military has addressed whether it must allow individuals to wear 
religious head coverings even if it is against the military rules.  The 
Goldman v. Weinberger case is about a rabbi, S. Simcha Goldman, who 
“brought suit against Secretary of Defense and others, claiming that 
application of an Air Force regulation to prevent him from wearing his 
yarmulke infringed upon his First Amendment right to free exercise of 
religion”79 Goldman contended that the Air Force regulation mandating 
uniform dress for Air Force personnel violates the law.80  Goldman 
 
 74.   Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1310; Singh, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 72.   
 75.   Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. at 2028; Autozone, slip op. at 1; J.B. Hunt 
Transport Settles EEOC Religious Discrimination Charge for $260,000, supra note 3.  
 76.   Webb, 562 F.3d at 258; Riback, 2008 WL 3211279, at *1.  
 77.   Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 853; Khatib, 639 F.3d. at 898.   
 78.   Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist., 911 F.2d at 882; Cooper, 723 P.2d at 298.  
 79.   Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1311. 
 80.   Id.   
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attempted to follow the rules by “wearing a service cap over the yarmulke 
while he was outdoors.”81  When he testified as a defense witness at a 
court-martial wearing his yarmulke without the service cap covering it, the 
opposing counsel put in a complaint arguing that Goldman’s “yarmulke 
was a violation of Air Force Regulation (AFR) 35-10.  This regulation 
states in pertinent part that ‘[headgear] will not be worn . . . [while] indoors 
except by armed security police in the performance of their duties.”82  
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted 
an injunction that enjoined the Air Force from enforcing the rule against 
Goldman and from penalizing him for wearing the yarmulke.83  After this 
ruling, the defendants appealed and the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed, “on the ground that the Air Force’s strong 
interest in discipline justified the strict enforcement of its uniform dress 
requirements.”84  The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari 
and held that Free Exercise Clause in “the First Amendment does not 
prohibit the challenged regulation from being applied to petitioner even 
though its effect is to restrict the wearing of the headgear required by his 
religious beliefs.  That Amendment does not require the military to 
accommodate . . . wearing a yarmulke” because it is their view that it 
would detract from the uniformity of the military.85 
Even though the Supreme Court held it would not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, according to the “Lemon Test,” it 
is controversial whether all the prongs are fulfilled and no violation exists 
for the Establishment Clause.86  To avoid a violation, there must be a 
significant secular purpose, the action must not have the primary effect of 
advancing or inhibiting religion, and it does not foster excessive 
entanglement between government and religion.87  Here, the court finds 
significant secular purpose, which is the need to maintain a uniform 
military and to “foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit 
de corps.”88  Nevertheless, as discussed in the case, armed security police 
are permitted to wear hats, so it is difficult to inhibit individuals in 
Goldman’s department from wearing hats.89  If the military is concerned 
about uniformity, it could provide matching hats as part of the uniform.90 
Next, the action must not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting 
religion.91  It can be argued that barring individuals from wearing visible 
 
 81.   Id.  
 82.   Id. at 1312.  
 83.   Id.  
 84.   Id.  
 85.   Id. at 1311.  
 86.   Lemon, 91 S. Ct. at 2111.  
 87.   Id.  
 88.   Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1313.  
 89.   See id.  
 90.   See Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1313. 
 91.   Lemon, 91 S. Ct. at 2111.  
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religious gear has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.92  Even though 
some may argue wearing religious gear creates a divided Air Force, this is 
not a strong argument because the entire outfit the individual wears is the 
same and including a matching uniform hat would fulfill the religious head 
covering obligation.93  Clearly, the addition of a hat would have no impact 
on national security.  Lastly, an individual may argue it does not foster 
excessive entanglement between government and religion.94  Therefore, 
even though the Supreme Court held that the prohibition of wearing a 
yarmulke is not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause in the First 
Amendment,95 the issue does not clearly satisfy the “Lemon Test” for the 
Establishment Clause, which causes it to be a point of controversy.96  
Conversely, unlike Goldman v. Weinberger where the Supreme Court 
ruled narrowly, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia has ruled more broadly to permit religious freedom in the 
military so there is no violation of RFRA.97  In Singh v. McHugh, a Hofstra 
University student, Iknoor Singh, sought to enroll in Reserve Officers 
Training Corps (ROTC), which is run by the army at his university.98  
Singh is a practicing Sikh and wears a beard, does not cut his hair, and 
wraps it inside a turban, which violates the Army uniform and grooming 
standards.99  “Plaintiff maintains the sincere belief that if he cut his hair, 
shaved his beard, or abandoned his turban, he would be ‘dishonoring and 
offending God.’”100  He brought an action against the Secretary of the 
Army and other officials alleging that the Army violated RFRA because it 
failed to accommodate his religious exercise by banning him from wearing 
a turban, unshorn hair, and a beard.101  In relevant part, Singh sought a 
preliminary injunction requiring the Army to process the accommodation 
or provide a preliminary enlistment if the request was denied, a declaratory 
judgment that defendants’ refusal to grant plaintiff a religious exemption to 
the Army’s grooming and uniform standards violates RFRA, and a 
permanent injunction ordering defendants to allow him to join ROTC.102   
According to Army Regulation A.R. 600-20, soldiers are permitted “to 
wear religious apparel while in uniform, including religious ‘headgear,’ if 
the apparel is ‘neat and conservative’ and it will not ‘interfere with the 
performance of military duties.’”103  Soldiers may wear religious headgear 
if it satisfies the following standards: it is subdued in color; can be covered 
 
 92.   See id.  
 93.   See Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1312.  
 94.   Lemon, 91 S. Ct. at 2111. 
 95.   Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1311. 
 96.   Lemon, 91 S. Ct. at 2111. 
 97.   Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1312; Singh, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 72.   
 98.   Singh, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 72.   
 99.   Id. at 74.  
 100.   Id. at 74. 
 101.   Id. at 76.  
 102.   Id.  
 103.   Singh, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 77. 
7 - GREEN_MACRO_REDLINE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2018  11:19 AM 
272 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:2 
by standard military headgear; has no writing, symbols, or pictures; and 
does not interfere with the functioning of protective clothing.104  “Soldiers 
are not authorized to wear religious headgear that does not meet these 
requirements while in uniform unless they have received a religious 
accommodation.”105  The Army grants religious accommodation requests 
“unless the accommodation will have an adverse impact on unit readiness, 
individual readiness, unit cohesion, morale, good order, discipline, safety, 
and/or health.”106  Men’s hair “‘must present a tapered appearance,’ and 
when combed, may ‘not fall over the ears or eyebrows, or touch the 
collar.”107  However, males “may wear wigs ‘to cover natural baldness or 
physical disfiguration’” and women may wear long hair.  Also, “men are 
required to ‘keep their face[s] clean-shaven when in uniform, or in civilian 
clothes on duty.’”108  Mustaches are accepted “as long as they are ‘neatly 
trimmed, tapered, and tidy.’”109  
The court used the RFRA test to determine whether Singh’s religious 
liberty had been violated.  The “‘[g]overnment shall not substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion’ unless it can ‘demonstrate that 
application of the burden to the person––(1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.’”110  Here, the court 
determined that the defendants had not shown how accommodating Singh’s 
religious preferences would do greater damage to the Army’s compelling 
interests in uniformity, discipline, credibility, unit cohesion, and training,” 
because the Army already had thousands of individuals with facial hair.111 
The Army had also previously made exceptions for Sikhs.112  Lastly, the 
defendants had not proven that barring Singh from wearing a turban, beard, 
and growing long hair was the least restrictive means of furthering their 
interest.113  Therefore, the student’s motion was granted because the Army 
did not fulfill its obligation in proving that barring Singh from joining the 
ROTC while wearing a beard, turban, and long hair was in furtherance of a 
governmental interest and that there was no other less restrictive means to 
do so.  
B. RELIGIOUS RESTRICTIONS AND ACCOMMODATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE 
Many public employment institutions have specific regulations that 
inhibit what an individual is permitted to wear.  In EEOC v. Abercrombie 
 
 104.   Id.   
 105.   Id. at 72.   
 106.   Id.  
 107.   Id.  
 108.   Id.  
 109.   Id.  
 110.   Id. at 80.  
 111.   Id. at 96.  
 112.   Id. at 94.  
 113.   Id. at 102.  
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& Fitch, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought 
a Title VII action on behalf of a Muslim job applicant against Abercrombie 
& Fitch for religious discrimination.114  Abercrombie & Fitch refused to 
hire Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, because the headscarf she wore 
for religious purposes conflicted with the employee dress policy.115  EEOC 
contended that Abercrombie violated Title VII, which “prohibits a 
prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of the 
applicant’s religious practice when the practice could be accommodated 
without undue hardship.”116  The potential employee alleged the retailer 
failed to make accommodations for the applicant to wear her headscarf.117 
The courts examined whether the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
prohibition “applies only where an applicant has informed the employer of 
his need for an accommodation.”118  The United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Oklahoma granted EEOC’s motion for summary 
judgment as to liability and awarded $20,000 in damages to Elauf.119 
Abercrombie & Fitch appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, which reversed the decision and remanded the case with 
instructions on the grounds that “an employer cannot be liable under Title 
VII for failing to accommodate a religious practice until the applicant (or 
employee) provides the employer with the actual knowledge of his need for 
an accommodation.”120   
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and held 
“that a job applicant seeking to prove a Title VII disparate treatment claim 
need only show that the need for a religious accommodation was a 
motivating factor in the prospective employer’s adverse decision, and need 
not show that the employer actually knew that the applicant’s practice was 
a religious practice that required an accommodation.”121  The Title VII 
“disparate-treatment provision requires Elauf to show that Abercrombie (1) 
‘fail[ed] . . . to hire’ her (2) ‘because of’ (3) ‘[her] religion.’ The “because 
of” standard is understood to mean that the protected characteristic cannot 
be a ‘motivating factor’ in an employment decision.”122  The Court 
contends that part (1) of the test is fulfilled because Abercrombie failed to 
hire Elauf.123 Part (3) is satisfied because “the parties concede that . . . 
Elauf’s wearing of a headscarf is (3) a ‘religious practice.’”124  
The (2) “because of” prong was the point of controversy.125  The Court 
 
 114.   Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. at 2028.  
 115.   Id. at 2030.  
 116.   Id.  
 117.   Id. at 2028.  
 118.   Id.  
 119.   Id.  
 120.   Id. 
 121.   Id.  
 122.   Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. at 2030. 
 123.   Id. at 2031.  
 124.   Id.  
 125.   Id.  
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examined the difference between knowledge and motive to figure out if the 
“because of” prong was satisfied.126  “An employer who has actual 
knowledge of the need for an accommodation does not violate Title VII by 
refusing to hire an applicant if avoiding that accommodation is not his 
motive.”127  However, “an employer who acts with the motive of avoiding 
accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has no more than an 
unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be needed.”128 
Therefore, employment decisions should not be made “because of” 
applicants’ religious practices.129  An employer may have a no-headwear 
policy generally, but “Title VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to give 
way to the need for an accommodation.”130   
In addition to Muslims facing discrimination in the workplace, Sikhs 
are also discriminated against because of their religious traditions.131  In 
EEOC v. Autozone, the EEOC brought a civil rights action on behalf of 
Mahoney Burroughs against Autozone under the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.132  EEOC alleged Autozone managers harassed Burroughs by 
“disparaging his religion, asking if he had joined Al-Qaeda, and whether he 
was a terrorist.”133  Autozone “failed to intervene when customers referred 
to him as ‘Bin Laden’ and made terrorist jokes.”134  The EEOC alleged that 
Autozone refused to let Mahoney wear a turban and kara, which is an 
obligatory part of Sikhism.135  Because of Autozone’s failure to protect 
Burrough’s religious liberty, Autozone violated the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.136  The United States District Court, for the Eastern District of 
Massachusetts granted summary judgment regarding the settlement.137  The 
parties came to a settlement and “in a consent decree approved by this 
court, . . . in addition to extensive injunctive relief, Mahoney Burroughs 
ought to receive $75,000.00 in monetary relief plus reasonable attorney’s 
fees.”138   
Similarly to the Autozone case, four Sikh truckers for J.B. Hunt 
 
 126.   Id. at 2033.  
 127.   Id.  
 128.   Id.  
 129.   Id. 
 130.   Id.  
 131.   Autozone, slip op. at 1.   
 132.   Id.  
 133.   AUTOZONE, INC. SETTLES FOR $75,000 IN SIKH DISCRIMINATION CASE, https://am 
ericanturban.com (last visited Mar. 10, 2017) (discussing religious discrimination where 
Burroughs was insulted and taunted merely because he wore a turban and kara for 
Sikhism).  
 134.   Id.  
 135.   Id.  
 136.   Id.  Beyond the monetary relief, there is a decree that “requires Autozone to adopt a 
policy prohibiting religious discrimination; train its managers and human resource 
employees on religious discrimination and the new policy; report to the EEOC …; distribute 
the new policy; and a notice … to it 65,000 employees.”   
 137.   Autozone, slip op. at 1.   
 138.   Id.   
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Transport Services were discriminated against in the workplace when J.B. 
Hunt insisted that the four Sikhs cut their beards and remove their turbans 
for drug testing.139  The four Sikh applicants were denied religious 
accommodations during the hiring process when they requested an 
alternative to the company’s hair sample drug testing policy along with not 
forcing them to remove their turbans during testing.140  It is a horrific 
religious violation in Sikhism for individuals to cut their hair or remove 
their turbans in public.141  The EEOC investigated the allegations and found 
reasonable cause to believe that J.B. Hunt failed to provide a religious 
accommodation and failed to hire a class of individuals due to their race, 
national origin, and religion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.142  To avoid litigation, J.B. Hunt agreed to pay the four Sikhs 
$260,000 as well as “revise its drug testing policy and take steps to make 
its hiring process more inclusive for qualified candidates regardless of race, 
national origin or religion.”143  
C. RELIGIOUS RESTRICTIONS IN THE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
In addition to the military and the workplace, discrimination occurs in 
the police force as well.  Webb v. City of Philadelphia discussed whether 
permitting Kimberlee Webb, a practicing Muslim, to wear a religious 
headscarf (Khimar or hijab), while on duty, would pose an undue burden 
on the City of Philadelphia.144  “Webb’s headscarf would cover neither her 
face nor her ears, but would cover her head and the back of her neck.”145  
The request to wear the headscarf was denied because of Philadelphia 
Police Directive 78, which “prescribes the approved Philadelphia police 
uniforms and equipment.  Nothing in Directive 78 authorizes the wearing 
of religious symbols or garb as part of the uniform.”146  Webb filed a 
complaint for the violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act with 
the EEOC and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.147  During 
this time, Webb arrived at work and refused to remove the headscarf and 
was sent home for failing to comply with Directive 78.148  She was told that 
her “conduct could lead to disciplinary action,” so she reported to work 
without a headscarf.149  “Disciplinary charges of insubordination were 
subsequently brought against Webb, resulting in a temporary thirteen-day 
 
 139.   Brian Melley, Sikh Truckers Reach Settlement in Faith Discrimination Case, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 15, 2016, 8:59 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org.  
 140.   Id.  
 141.   Id.  
 142.   J.B. Hunt Transport Settles EEOC Religious Discrimination Charge for $260,000, 
supra note 3. 
 143.   Id.  
 144.   Webb, 562 F.3d at 258.  
 145.   Id. 
 146.   Id.  
 147.   Webb, 562 F.3d at 258. 
 148.   Id.  
 149.   Id.  
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suspension.”150   
In relevant part, Webb brought an action for religious discrimination 
under Title VII.151  “The District Court found that Directive 78 and [its] 
‘detailed standards with no accommodation for religious symbols and attire 
not only promote the needs for uniformity, but also enhance cohesiveness, 
cooperation, and the esprit de corps of the police force.’”152  Philadelphia 
would suffer an undue hardship if it were forced to permit Webb and other 
individuals to wear religious clothing with their uniforms.153  The District 
Court held Webb “failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact for the 
Title VII religious discrimination” claim.154  Webb appealed this to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  “To establish a prima 
facie case of religious discrimination, the employee must show: (1) she 
holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement; (2) she 
informed her employer of the conflict; and (3) she was disciplined for 
failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.”155  After establishing 
these factors, the employer must show either “a good-faith effort to 
reasonably accommodate the religious belief, or such an accommodation 
would work an undue hardship upon the employer.”156  There is an “‘undue 
hardship’ if it would impose more than a de minimis cost on the 
employer.”157  
The Third Circuit held that even though Webb established a case of 
religious discrimination, the police department met the burden of 
establishing an undue hardship.158  The court agreed with the police 
department that it is more important to maintain the “perception of its 
impartiality by citizens of all races and religions whom the police are 
charged to serve and protect.”159  If Derivative 78 is not strictly enforced, 
“the values of impartiality, religious neutrality, uniformity, and the 
subordination of personal preference would be severely damaged to the 
detriment of the proper functioning of the police department.”160  
Therefore, the Third Circuit decided to follow the Directive 78 and bar 
individuals from wearing religious clothing while on duty with their police 
uniforms.   
Riback v. L.V. Met. Pol. Dept. also discussed alleged discrimination of 
an individual’s religious freedom in the police.  An Orthodox Jewish police 
officer who worked for the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and 
 
 150.   Id.  
 151.   Id.  
 152.   Id.  
 153.   Id. at 158–59. 
 154.   Id. at 259.  
 155.   Id. 
 156.   Id.  
 157.   Id. at 260.  
 158.   Id. at 261.  
 159.   Id.  
 160.   Webb, 562 F.3d at 261. 
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wanted to wear a yarmulke and a beard to observe his Jewish customs.161  
However, “his profession requires that he shave and not wear a hat 
indoors.”162  Subsequent to transferring to the police’s Quality Assurance 
department, Riback obtained permission to wear a trimmed beard and a 
yarmulke.163  “After six weeks, Deputy Chief Ault noticed Riback’s beard” 
and ordered for him to conform to the police guidelines.164  Riback 
requested that the police make formal religious accommodations for his 
beard and yarmulke.165  The police denied his requests on the grounds that 
“(1) beards prevent the proper fitting of gas masks, (2) beards provide 
additional means for a suspect to gain an advantage when engaged in 
combat with an officer, and (3) beards undermine officer uniformity.”166 
They also contended that Riback could not wear his yarmulke because 
“wearing religious symbols would undermine officer neutrality and erode 
public trust.”167  Riback brought this action after the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission granted him the right to sue.168  The 
court held a hearing for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the police 
department from punishing Riback for wearing a quarter-inch beard, but 
did not permit Riback to wear the yarmulke.169  Both parties moved for 
summary judgment.170  
In relevant part, the court held that the police department violated 
Riback’s First Amendment rights in regard to the beard when they 
prohibited him from wearing one.171  To reiterate the validity of the court’s 
First Amendment finding, the “Lemon Test” can be applied to this situation 
and also find an Establishment Clause breach.172  To avoid a violation 
under the “Lemon Test,” there must be a significant secular purpose, the 
action must not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, 
and it does not foster excessive entanglement between government and 
religion.173  The significant secular purpose to oppose permitting a beard 
would be to promote uniformity, neutrality, and create a safer atmosphere 
in the field.174  However, the action here does have the primary effect of 
inhibiting Judaism because the court discusses a case, Employment Div., 
Dep’t. of Human Res. Of Or. v. Smith, that allows an exception for medical 
 
 161.   Riback v. L.V. Met. Pol. Dept., 2008 WL 3211279, at *1. 
 162.   Id.  
 163.   Id.  
 164.   Id.  
 165.   Id.  
 166.   Id.  
 167.   Id.  
 168.   Id. at *2. 
 169.   Id.  
 170.   Id.  
 171.   Id. at *6.  
 172.   Lemon, 91 S. Ct. at 2111. 
 173.   Lemon, 91 S. Ct. at 2111. 
 174.   Riback, 2008 WL 3211279, at *5. 
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beards.175  The court explains here how there is no strong distinction 
between allowing beards for medical purposes and allowing beards for 
religion.176  Therefore, barring Riback from wearing a beard and yarmulke 
would excessively entangle the government and religion because 
prohibiting Riback from wearing a beard and yarmulke for religious 
purposes would make it appear that the government is dismissing Judaism 
and any religion that would need an exception.177  Therefore, prong two 
and three of the “Lemon Test” are not satisfied and the court correctly held 
that Riback’s First Amendment right was violated.178   
Nevertheless, the court followed a previous ruling from the Smith case 
that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability 
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his 
religion prescribes (or proscribes).”179  The police department’s policy to 
ban hats applied to all officers, “and there is no evidence that it is 
motivated by religious animus.”180  Therefore, the court held it was not a 
violation of the federal Constitution or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 for the police department to enforce its no headgear rule.181  
Even though the court believed the rule was neutral, having a particular 
rule that bars an individual from expressing his or her religious beliefs 
shows an inclination against religion.  The purpose of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 is to avoid discrimination against prospective 
employees when employers refuse to hire an applicant to avoid 
accommodating a religious practice that it could accommodate without 
undue hardship.182  Here, the police department argued it would be a 
hardship to accommodate the religious preferences because it would 
interfere with performance and uniformity of the crew.183  However, there 
are ways around yarmulkes affecting performance.  For example, many 
police departments and state troopers require the officers to wear hats.184 
Even though this section of the office did not, the department could allow 
for officers to choose to wear a hat that matches the uniform.185  
Riback also demonstrated that “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating factor”186  for Riback’s altercation with the police 
department.  This violates the purpose of Title VII because the point of the 
 
 175.   Id.  
 176.   Id. at *6. 
 177.   See id.  
 178.   See id.  
 179.   Id.  
 180.   Id.  
 181.   See id.  
 182.   Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. at 2031. 
 183.   Riback, 2008 WL 3211279, at *1.  
 184.   See Riback, 2008 WL 3211279, at 11.  
 185.   See id.  
 186.   The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 
(1991).   
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act is to avoid religion being a motivating factor regarding hardships at 
work.187  Therefore, in addition to the department not making reasonable 
accommodations that would not greatly interfere with its functioning, the 
motivating factor for barring the yarmulke was that religion would not be 
expressed, which is a violation of the Act.188  The court’s holding in Riback 
v. L.V. Metro. Police Dept. unfortunately enforces a law that overlooks an 
individual’s right to religious freedom.189  
D. RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS IN HOLDING CELLS AND PRISONS 
The courts have also protected the religious freedom of 
institutionalized individuals in prisons and holding cells.190  Congress 
passed RLUIPA to “protect institutionalized persons who are unable freely 
to attend their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the 
government’s permission and accommodation for exercise of their 
religion.”191  The purpose of RLUIPA is to prohibit “state and local 
governments from imposing ‘a substantial burden on the religious exercise 
of a person residing in or confined to an institution’ unless the government 
demonstrates that imposing that burden ‘is the least restrictive means’ of 
furthering a ‘compelling governmental interest.’”192  The term “‘institution’ 
includes ‘a jail, prison, or other correctional facility’ and ‘a pretrial 
detention facility.’”193  
In Holt v. Hobbs, the Supreme Court of the United States broadly ruled 
to allow religious observance in prisons.194  A Muslim prisoner brought suit 
against the Director of Arkansas Department of Correction and other 
workers, in violation of RLUIPA, for the denial of the right to wear a half-
inch beard.195  Nevertheless, the prison permits inmates with a diagnosed 
skin condition to grow a one-quarter inch beard.196  The Magistrate ruled 
that “beards compromised prison safety because they could be used to hide 
contraband and because an inmate could quickly shave his beard to 
disguise his identity.”197  The district court and the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit adopted the Magistrate’s ruling because the prison “had 
satisfied its burden of showing that the grooming policy was the least 
restrictive means of furthering its compelling security interests,” and courts 
must “defer to prison officials on matters of security.”198  
 
 187.   See id.  
 188.   See id.  
 189.   See Riback, 2008 WL 3211279, at *10-11. 
 190.   See Khatib, 639 F.3d. at 898.  
 191.   Id. at 900.  
 192.   Id.  
 193.   Id.  
 194.   Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 853 (2015). 
 195.   Id. at 856.  
 196.   Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. at 856. 
 197.   Id. at 857 
 198.   Id.  Even though prison officials are experts in running prisons and evaluating the 
likely effects of altering prison rules, RLUIPA’s rigorous standard must still be applied.  Id. 
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Subsequently, Holt appealed the case to the Supreme Court.199  Hobbs 
had to show that the refusal to allow the petitioner to grow a one-half inch 
beard “‘(1) [was] in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) [was] the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.’”200  First, the Court held that the grooming policy 
substantially burdened prisoners’ exercise of religion while failing to 
further the Department’s compelling interest in preventing prisoners from 
hiding contraband.201  Next, the grooming policy was not the least 
restrictive means of preventing prisoners from hiding contraband or 
preventing prisoners from distinguishing their identities.202  Lastly, the 
grooming policy was underinclusive with respect to security risks.203  “The 
Department already searches prisoners’ hair and clothing, and it 
presumably examines the [one-quarter]-inch beards of inmates with 
dermatological conditions.”204  Hobbs did not offer a reason why the one-
half inch beards cannot be searched for contraband, how a one-fourth-inch 
beard has different effects over a one-eighth-inch beard, or why a less 
restrictive means is not attainable.205  
Although it is vital for fast and accurate identification of prisoners and 
shaving one’s beard may interfere with identification, the policy of barring 
Holt from growing his beard was a violation of RLUIPA.206  The 
Department could resolve the issue of accurate identification by 
photographing all the prisoners without beards and periodically 
thereafter.207  “Once that is done, an inmate like petitioner could be allowed 
to grow a short beard and could be photographed again when the beard 
reached the [one-half-inch] limit.”208  The prison would then have a 
bearded and non-bearded photograph.209  Hobbs failed to show that the 
“prison system is so different from the many institutions that allow facial 
hair [and] that the dual photo method cannot be employed.”210  Therefore, 
in this case, the Department’s grooming policy violates RLUIPA and Holt 
must be permitted to grow a beard for his religious observance.  
Khatib v. County of Orange in the Ninth Circuit additionally 
demonstrates a broad interpretation of the meaning of the RLUIPA 
 
at 864.   
 199.   Id. at 857.  
 200.   Id. at 860.  
 201.   Id. at 864.  
 202.   Id.  
 203.   Id. at 865. 
 204.   Id. at 865 (discussing lack of contrast between prison’s current rules that permit one-
fourth inch beards, head hair, and clothing to be searched).  
 205.   Id.  
 206.   Id.  
 207.   Id.  
 208.   Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. at 865. 
 209.   Id. 
 210.   Id.  
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statute.211  Souhair Khatib, a former detainee, sued the County of Orange 
for allegedly violating RLUIPA “by requiring her to remove her headscarf, 
in public, against her Muslim religious beliefs and practice,” when she was 
held in a county courthouse holding facility.212  An officer ordered Khatib 
to remove her headscarf.213  Having her head uncovered in front of men in 
public “is a ‘serious breach of [Khatib’s] faith and a deeply humiliating and 
defiling experience.’”214  Even though she explained to the officers that her 
religious beliefs mandated that she wear a headscarf and begged to keep it 
on, the officers said either she must take it off or they would.215  Khatib 
took it off, but experienced extreme “‘discomfort,’ ‘distress,’ and 
‘humiliat[ion].’”216  The issue considered was “whether the Orange County 
Santa Ana Courthouse holding facility, where . . . individuals are detained 
in connection with court proceedings, is an ‘institution’ as defined by 
RLUIPA.”217  
The United States District Court for the Central District of California 
granted the County of Orange’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim.218  The district court believed that since Khatib’s stay at the holding 
facility was temporary, unlimited religious freedom was impractical.219 
RLUIPA applies to longer-term institutions, but not short-term ones.220 
Khatib appealed this ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, which held that the “holding facility [at the courthouse] was 
an ‘institution’ under RLUIPA” and, therefore, was protected under the 
RLUIPA statute.221  The court determined that the facility was a pretrial 
detention facility because it is “a facility where individuals who are not yet 
convicted are held pending court proceedings.”222  The court in a 2006-
2007 Grand Jury Report characterized the Santa Ana facility as “‘a secure 
detention facility located within a court building used for the confinement 
of persons.’”223  
Furthermore, even though the facility is a detention facility, it also falls 
 
 211.   Khatib v. County of Orange, 639 F.3d. 898, 898 (2011).  See also Knight v. 
Thompson, 797 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 2015).  This case also discusses how the courts rule 
narrowly and bar religious freedom in prisons.  A Native-American man challenged the 
prison’s short-hair policy.  He brought a RLUIPA case against the prison for its failure to 
accommodate his religious observance.  The court held that the prison was not violating 
RLUIPA when it did not permit him to keep his hair long in observance of his religion.   
 212.   Khatib, 639 F.3d at 898.   
 213.   Id. at 901.  
 214.   Id.  
 215.   Id.  
 216.   Id. 
 217.   Id. at 900.  
 218.   Id. at 898.  
 219.   Id. at 901.  
 220.   See id.  
 221.   Khatib, 639 F.3d at 898.  
 222.   Id. at 903.  
 223.   Id.  
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under the definition of a jail.224  “A ‘jail’ is a ‘building for the confinement 
of persons held in lawful custody.”225  It would fulfill this dictionary 
definition of a jail because the definition of a secure detention facility “falls 
squarely within the ordinary common definition of a ‘jail.’”226  Because the 
Santa Ana facility falls within the RLUIPA statute, the court supported the 
belief that individuals are entitled to religious freedom within public 
institutions, specifically jails.227  
E.   RELIGIOUS RESTRICTIONS AND ACCOMMODATIONS FOR TEACHERS IN 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
In addition to prisons, the military, and workplaces, public schools 
have also faced conflicting views regarding whether teachers may wear 
religious garb under the First Amendment and VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.  Some courts have ruled very firmly.228  In United States v. Bd. of 
Educ., a teacher brought suit alleging she should be allowed to wear 
religious clothing in the course of her duties.229  Alima Delores Reardon is 
Muslim and believes women, when in public, must cover their entire body 
except her face and hands.230  “‘She wore while teaching . . . a head scarf 
which covered her head, neck, and bosom leaving her face visible and a 
long loose dress which covered her arms to her wrists.’”231  Reardon taught 
in this attire for many years without any issues.232  Then, she began to 
substitute teach at different schools and the principals told her that 
“pursuant to state law, she could not teach in her religious clothing due to 
Pennsylvania’s Garb Statute.”233  The state statute provided that “no teacher 
in any public school shall wear in said school or while engaged in 
performance of his duty as such teacher, any dress, mark, emblem or 
insignia indicating that fact that such teacher is a member or adherent of 
any religious order, sect or denomination.”234  
Reardon filed a complaint with the EEOC and the EEOC concluded 
that the School Board and the Commonwealth had violated Title VII.235  
The Department of Justice filed a complaint in the district court contending 
that the Board “(1) ‘fail[ed] or refus[ed] to employ as public school 
teachers individuals who wear or who seek to wear garb or dress that is an 
aspect of their religious observance,’ and (2) ‘fail[ed] or refus[ed] 
reasonably to accommodate individuals who wear or who seek to wear garb 
 
 224.   Id. at 904.  
 225.   Id.  
 226.   Id. at 905.  
 227.   Id. at 898.  
 228.   Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist., 911 F.2d at 882.   
 229.   Id. 
 230.   Id. at 884. 
 231.   See id. at 884.   
 232.   See id. at 885.  
 233.   Id.  
 234.   Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist., 911 F.2d at 885. 
 235.   Id.  
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or dress . . . that is an aspect of their religious observance in practice.’”236 
However, because the Commonwealth “was not an ‘employer’ of Reardon 
within the meaning of Title VII,” Title VII could not be enforced.237  The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
entered judgment against the School Board and ordered the Board not to 
favor the Garb Statute.238  
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in relevant part, that to 
allow Ms. Reardon to wear the religious garb would have imposed undue 
hardship on the school board to allow her to teach in religious garb and, 
therefore, did not violate the VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.239  “For 
the Board to have accommodated Ms. Reardon, it would have been 
required to expose its administrators to a substantial risk of criminal 
prosecution, fines, and expulsion from the profession.”240  The court agreed 
with the Board that this would be an undue hardship.241  The Garb state 
statute “bans all religious attire and is being enforced by the 
Commonwealth in a non-discriminatory manner.”242  Therefore, the court 
ruled in favor of the Board and the Commonwealth and created precedent 
that teachers may not wear religious garb in public schools.243  
The court’s belief that accommodating Ms. Reardon would cause 
undue hardship and forgo religious neutrality ignores Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.244  The court is overly concerned about the burden that 
accommodating religious freedom would place on the Board, even though 
the risks the Board faces are merely possible, and fails to emphasize the 
federal right individuals possess to practice or not practice a religion.245  
Also, the court discusses that the state statute is neutral toward religion.246 
However, barring individuals from wearing religious clothing is not neutral 
and illustrates hostile feelings toward those following religions because 
individuals are not allowed to practice or show any way of following a 
religion in public school settings.247  Unfortunately, the Third Circuit is 
setting precedent to suppress religious beliefs.248   
Similarly to United States v. Bd. of Educ.,249 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. 
Dist. No. 4J also discusses barring individuals from wearing religious garb 
 
 236.   Khatib, 639 F.3d at 885. 
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in public schools.250  Janet Cooper, a special education teacher in the 
Eugene public schools, became a Sikh and wore white clothes and a turban 
while teaching the sixth and eighth grade classes.251  Ms. Cooper explained 
to the staff and students of the school that she would wear the turban and 
white clothing to follow the Sikhism religion.252  “She continued to wear 
her white garb after being warned that she faced suspension if she violated 
a law against wearing religious dress at her work.”253  
The state law, ORS 342.650 declares: “No teacher in any public school 
shall wear any religious dress while engaged in the performance of duties 
as a teacher.”254  ORS 342.655 declares: “Any teacher violating the 
provisions of ORS 342.650 shall be suspended from employment by the 
district school board.255  The board shall report its action to the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction who shall revoke the teacher’s 
teaching certificate.”256  The school superintendent suspended Ms. Cooper 
from teaching and the Superintendent of Public Instruction revoked her 
teaching certificate even though she was tenured.257  The order was 
challenged on constitutional grounds and the Court of Appeals “set aside 
revocation of [the] teaching certificate as excessive sanction under [the] 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.”258  The 
Superintendent appealed the finding to the Supreme Court of Oregon.259  
The Supreme Court of Oregon held that 
(1) [the] religious dress statute, when correctly interpreted, did not 
violate [the] State’s guarantees of religious freedom or [the] . . . 
First Amendment, and (2) revocation of [the] teaching certificate 
was disqualification from teaching in public schools based upon 
one’s doing so in manner incompatible with that function, rather 
than ‘sanction’ by reason of hostility to religious and political 
belief.260 
The court declared that this was a revocation of a license issue and 
should not be turned into a constitutional law issue.261  However, if the 
court only concentrates on revoking a teaching license, it is missing the 
major issue that caused the revocation of the license.262  It appears that the 
court merely wants to take the easy way out and not address the larger 
 
 250.   Cooper v. Eugene School Dist., 723 P.2d 298, 298 (1986).   
 251.   Id. at 300.  
 252.   Id.  
 253.   Id.  
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 255.   Cooper v. Eugene School Dist., 723 P.2d at 300. 
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 258.   Id. at 300–01. 
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matter causing the problem.263  The Supreme Court of Oregon reasoned 
that when the state statute of ORS 342.650 can validly be applied, the 
revocation of a teaching certificate under ORS 342.655 is not a penalty or 
violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution.264  Because the 
revocation “is not a withdrawal of a privilege by reason of hostility to a 
religious or political belief,” and because Ms. Cooper was teaching in a 
manner incompatible with the rules for public schools, the Superintendent 
had a right to withdraw the license.265  However, Ms. Cooper was teaching 
in a manner incompatible with the state rules because the rules barred her 
freedom of religion, which is a direct violation of the federal 
Constitution.266 Even though the court argued this is not a federal 
Constitutional issue, when the “Lemon Test” is applied, there is an 
Establishment Clause violation.267  To avoid a violation, there must be a 
significant secular purpose, the action must not have the primary effect of 
advancing or inhibiting religion, and it does not foster excessive 
entanglement between government and religion.268  
Here, there is not a strong secular purpose to bar Ms. Cooper from 
wearing religious garb.269  The purpose is to maintain religious neutrality, 
but by banning an individual from following his or her religion, a negative 
emphasis is placed on religion and is, therefore, not neutral.270  The purpose 
of barring Ms. Cooper from observing Sikhism is to suppress religious 
beliefs from public schools.271  By doing so, the ruling excessively 
entangles the government with religion in public schools.272  Therefore, the 
judgment runs contrary to the “Lemon Test.”273  Furthermore, this court 
missed the reasoning behind why a violation of the state statute occurred 
and merely looked to see that a violation did occur.274  The state statute is 
archaic and should not bar an individual from practicing his religion as 
long as he does not impose his religious views on others.275  Consequently, 
the court in Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J incorrectly overlooked the 
violations of the federal Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 because granting the accommodation does not harm others, and 
also only looked at the surface issues of revocation of a license and the 
violation of the state statute.276   
 
 263.   See id.  
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CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, far too many individuals experience religious 
discrimination in the military, workplace, police force, prisons, and public 
schools. Courts have set narrow precedent when it comes to deciding 
religious liberty, as we seen in Goldman v. Weinberger, Webb v. City of 
Philadelphia, Riback v. L.V. Metro. Police Dept., Khatib v. County of 
Orange, United States v. Bd. of Educ., and Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 
4J.277  This has resulted in federal constitutional violations under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as violations under the Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and RLUIPA.278  Even though courts are 
concerned about neutrality or uniformity, to deny an individual a right to 
express his or her own religion when there is no definite harm to others 
indicates a preference against religion.279  Hopefully, courts will broaden 
their views, as they did in the Singh v. McHugh, EEOC v. Abercrombie & 
Fitch, EEOC v. Autozone, J.B. Hunt Transport Services, and the Holt v. 
Hobbs cases, to uphold an American’s right to freedom of religion.280   
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